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Argued December 5, 2005
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 22, 2005)
                        
Thomas E. Moseley    [ARGUED]
One Gateway Center
Suite 2600
Newark, NJ  07102
    Counsel for Petitioner
Christopher C. Fuller
Thankful T. Vanderstar    [ARGUED]
U.S. Department of Justice
2Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC  20044
    Counsel for Respondent
                         
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Mahesh Nenumal Tejwani petitions for review of the September 13, 2004 decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) summarily affirming the Immigration
Judge (“IJ”)’s June 20, 2003 removal order.  That order followed the IJ’s determination,
in a series of opinions, that New York Penal Law section 470.10(1) was a “crime
involving moral turpitude,” and that Tejwani’s 2000 conviction for violating that
provision rendered him deportable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and, for the reasons that follow,
will grant the petition for review.
I.
We will limit our factual discussion to those events relevant to our analysis. 
Tejwani is a native and citizen of India who was admitted to the United States as a lawful
permanent resident in 1995.  On November 30, 2000, Tejwani pleaded guilty to two
counts of money laundering in the second degree, N.Y. Penal § 470.10(1), in New York
Supreme Court.  The statute as it was then written required proof that the actor knew that
    1The statute provided, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of money laundering in the second degree when that person
exchanges or receives in exchange, in one or more transactions, one or more
monetary instruments which are the proceeds of specified criminal conduct
and have a total value exceeding ten thousand dollars for one or more other
monetary instruments and/or equivalent property when that person knows that
the monetary instrument or instruments exchanged or received in exchange are
the proceeds of any criminal conduct and that person:
1.  intentionally makes the exchange to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of such proceeds . .
. .
N.Y. Penal Law § 470.10 (McKinney 2000).
3
he was laundering the proceeds of “any criminal conduct.”1
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) served Tejwani with a Notice
to Appear on October 5, 2001, charging that he was removable for conviction of an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  When that charge was dismissed,
the INS charged Tejwani with removability for conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude within five years of the date of admission to the United States.  8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(i).
Tejwani applied to terminate removal proceedings.  The IJ assigned to Tejwani’s
case issued three interlocutory orders concerning Tejwani’s deportability.  Each time, she
concluded that Tejwani was deportable, albeit for slightly different reasons.  In the first
order, the IJ relied on language in the indictment that described acts to which Tejwani
had not pleaded guilty.  March 17, 2003 IJ Decision at *1.  Tejwani moved to reconsider
    2We note that the IJ’s statement in this opinion that the underlying drug trafficking
“cannot be ignored,” May 30, 2003 IJ Decision at *6, contradicts her seeming recognition
that such conduct should not have been taken into account.  It is also at least potentially at
odds with our case law requiring IJs and the BIA to analyze whether a crime is a crime
involving moral turpitude under the “categorical approach,” see De Leon-Reynoso v.
Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 2002), unless one of the two exceptions to that
approach applies.  See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 92 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004).
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and, in a second order, dated March 17, 2003, the IJ acknowledged her earlier mistake. 
Id. at *2.  Nevertheless, the IJ sustained the charge of deportability on the grounds that
N.Y. Penal Law § 470.10(1) qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude.  Id. at *5. 
The IJ determined, based on the indictment, that the “criminal conduct” underlying
Tejwani’s money laundering conviction was drug trafficking, and reasoned that, because
drug trafficking is a crime involving moral turpitude, Tejwani’s crime similarly involved
moral turpitude.  Id. at *6-7.  
Tejwani again moved for reconsideration.  On May 30, 2003, the IJ issued a third
order, which incorporated the rationale of the March 17 order and further sustained the
charge against Tejwani on the grounds that money laundering itself, regardless of the
underlying criminal conduct, qualifies as a crime of moral turpitude.  See May 30, 2003
IJ Decision, at *6-7.2  The IJ issued her final decision, ordering Tejwani’s removal to
India, on June 20, 2003.  The BIA subsequently affirmed the IJ’s decision without
opinion pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).
II.
    3Since the IJ’s decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has opined that money
laundering to conceal drug proceeds does constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. 
Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Tejwani claims that the BIA abused its discretion in summarily affirming the IJ’s
decision.  We agree.  The BIA is entitled to streamline its case load, but it must do so in
accordance with the applicable regulations.  Accordingly, we may grant a petition for
review where we conclude that the BIA’s decision to streamline a case was “arbitrary and
capricious.”  Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 296 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Before a case can be properly streamlined, the reviewing BIA member must
determine that either (A) the issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing BIA or
federal court precedent or (B) the issues raised on appeal are not so substantial that the
case warrants the issuance of a written opinion.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(i).  Neither
condition was met here.  The issue in this case was one of first impression.  Over the
course of her three interlocutory orders, the IJ made the need for guidance abundantly
clear, see May 30 Decision at *2 (“[T]here really is no case precedent on this issue of
whether money laundering is a crime involving moral turpitude.”); id. at *5 (“[Q]uite
honestly, there is simply no case law that interprets whether money laundering is a crime
involving moral turpitude that this court has been able to locate.”).3  Moreover, the
question presented here – whether money laundering involves moral turpitude – is a legal
issue substantial enough to warrant the issuance of a written opinion by a panel of the
BIA.
6We therefore conclude that the BIA’s decision to affirm the IJ’s decision on this
matter of first impression without issuing an opinion was arbitrary and capricious in light
of the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).  
III.
As we have noted, “arbitrary and capricious application of the streamlining
regulations can result in building case law that is fashioned without the benefit of agency
expertise.”  Smriko, 387 F.3d at 297.  This is particularly so where, with respect to an
issue such as this, we would owe the BIA’s reasoned determination Chevron deference. 
See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87-88 (3d Cir. 2004) (adopting the majority view
that courts owe Chevron deference “not only to the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude
but also to its determination that the elements of a criminal statute satisfy that
definition”).  “Rather than usurping the role of the BIA and establishing a precedent that
the Board’s expertise might counsel against,” Smriko, 387 F.3d at 297, we will grant
Tejwani’s petition for review, vacate the BIA’s decision, and remand for further
proceedings in order that the BIA may determine, in the first instance, whether money
laundering, as it is defined in the New York statute under which Tejwani was convicted,
is a “crime involving moral turpitude.”  
